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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a contract action by an architect for fees
due from defendant for work done prior to cancellation of
the written contract between the parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was dismissed with prejudice before trial
and with no motion for dismissal or other hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's
judgment of dismissal and a remand of the case for trial
or other appropriate proceedings so that a resolution may
be made of the issues presented in the action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by plaintiff, an architect
licensed by the State of Utah, for collection of an amount
claimed to be due under a written contract for architectural
services with East Millard Recreation District.

Plaintiff

requested that the matter be set for trial and a pretrial
hearing was held in the District Court on March 17, 1981.
No pretrial order was entered and counsel was instructed
that a pretrial order would be held in abeyance (Transcript
March 17, 1981, hearing, page 7).

At the conclusion of the

pretrial conference, both parties were given leave to file
motions for summary judgment within 20 days (Transcript,
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pp. 6-7).

Neither party did so.

The matter was placed on

the monthly law and motion calendar in Millard County for
July 14, 1981,
party.

(Record p. 18) without notice to either

No one appeared and the case was continued.

On

September 1, 1981, counsel for plaintiff called the court's
attention to the case by letter requesting a trial date
(Record p. 23} .

The matter was again placed on the Millard

County law and motion calendar for September 15, 1981,
(Transcript September 15, 1981, hearing; Record p. 19),
again without notice to counsel and again neLther party
appeared.

At that time the court ruled that the case

should be dismissed with prejudice.

On November 24, 1981,

counsel for plaintiff received from the trial court administrators a notice of a trial in the matter set for April
21, 1982 (Record p. 22) although that notice was apparently
not filed by the administrator with the county clerk and is
not part of the record.

On December 2, 1981, the court

signed a judgment of dismissal which had been prepared by
counsel for defendant (Record p. 20).

A copy of that judg-

ment was mailed by the clerk's office to counsel for plaintiff and was received by him on December 22, 1981 (Record
p. 22) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WAS AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL

COURT'S DISCRETION.
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Discretion, by its very nature, is difficult of
precise definition and to precisely classify it is a difficult undertaking.

The standard for determining whether

a court has abused its discretion is not a hard and fast
rule.

Abuse of discretion "arises from action beyond the

bounds of fair discretion, exceeding the bounds of reason.
It has been defined as 'an erroneous conclusion and judgment, one clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.'"
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 ALR2d 1354
at 1365 (1956), citing McFarlan v. Fowler Bank City Trust
Co., 214 Ind. 10, 12 N.E.2d 752, 754.

Abuse of discretion

does not necessarily imply a dishonest motive or act but
only that the trial court made an unreasonable ruling.
The ruling of the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's
action with prejudice is plainly an abuse of discretion
under the standard as set forth above.

The reasons given

by the court in its September 15, 1981, ruling from the
bench show that the court's discretion was abused.

The

court dismissed the case for "failure of counsel for plaintiff to submit a pretrial order", for failure to submit
briefs, for failure to file motions for summary judgment,
because "both parties have abandoned their lawsuit", and
because "there is no legal entity, East Millard Recreation
District"

(Transcript, September 15, 1981, pp. 1-2).

None
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of these reasons is an adequate justification for the
court's judgment of dismissal.

First, counsel for plain-

tiff was specifically directed at the pretrial hearing
that the pretrial order would be held in abeyance (Transcript, March 17, 1981, p. 7).

Second, filing of briefs

was discretionary with counsel or was replaced by the granting of leave to file motions for summary judgment (Transcript,
March 17, 1981, pp. 5-7}.
such a brief.

In any event, neither party filed

Plaintiff should not be the only party pun-

ished for any such failure.

Third, the court at no time

required counsel to submit motions for summary judgment but
only granted leave to do so within a specific time (Transcript,
March 17, 1981, pp. 6-7}.

Fourth, plaintiff had certainly

not abandoned the litigation but was waiting for the matter
to be set for trial so that the issues presented by the complaint could be resolved.
setting.

Plaintiff had requested a trial

In fact, with no knowledge that the matter was even

on the court's law and motion calendar for September 15, 1981,
plaintiff's counsel wrote to the court on September 1, 1981,
to remind the court that the matter should be set for trial
(Record p. 23).

The court knew, or should have known that

plaintiff was still pursuing the matter.

Fifth, the existence

or non-existence of a legal entity known as East Millard
Recreation District is one of the fundamental issues of the
litigation and cannot be resolved by the court in such an
offhand manner.

It involves factual questions on which the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court has as yet heard no evidence.
Plaintiff had certainly not failed to prosecute his
case.

Plaintiff had requested a trial setting, had attended

the pretrial conference, and then had waited approximately
4 1/2 months after the court's discretionary period for filing
motions for summary judgment before reminding the court that
the case still needed to bet set for trial.

That certainly

is not a failure to prosecute so as to justify the court's
dismissal of the action.

This Court has ruled that to dismiss

an action after much longer delays than that was an abuse of
discretion.

Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977); Utah

Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Johnson v.
Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977).
Furthermore, plaintiff's counsel cannot be expected to
appear at any hearing of which he has received no notice.
In spite of the recitation to the contrary in the judgment
of dismissal (Record p. 20) , no order to show cause nor any
other notice was served upon plaintiff's counsel and the
record does not reflect that any such notice was given.

To

act without such notification to counsel is the worst abuse
of the court's discretion.

That action violates all standards

of justice and fair play which our judicial system is to
guarantee.
POINT II:

DISMISSAL OF THE LITIGATION WAS CONTRARY TO THE

PROVISIONS OF RULES S(a) AND 4l(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL

-5-
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PROCEDURE.
Rule 4l(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifies when a matter may be dismissed.

Such a dismissal

with prejudice may be granted to defendant only upon defendant's motion for one of three grounds:

failure of pl~intiff

to prosecute, failure of plaintiff to comply with the Rules
of Civil Procedure, or failure to obey any order of court.
There was no such motion made by defendant in this action,
or at least it does not appear in the record.

If such a

motion was made, it did not comply with Rule 5(a).

The latter

rule requires that notices and motions be in writing and be
served upon all parties.

The record shows that no such ser-

vice was made on counsel for plaintiff.

In fact, there was

no notice at all of hearings held July 14, 1981, and September 15, 1981.
Nor can plaintiff be charged with notice of the hearings
under the Fifth Judicial District's special rule which reads:
"Motions on file five days prior to a motion day are considered set for hearing without notice on such motion day, unless
request is made for a later hearing."

In this case, there

was no motion pending and therefore no reason for the case to
be on the monthly law and motion calendar without notice to
the parties.
Even if the court has authority under Rule 4l(b) or
some other inherent authority to dismiss the case without a
motion by defendant, it, too, must comply with Rule 5(a) and
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give notice to plaintiff.

That rule, by its own terms, is

as binding upon the court as on an adverse party.

In addi-

tion, the dismissal with prejudice must be based on one of
the grounds specified in Rule 4l(b}.

As shown under Point

I above, plaintiff had not failed to prosecute his case.
Polk v. Ivers, supra; Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, supra; Johnson
v. Firebrand, Inc., supra.

There has been no violation by

plaintiff of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor has plaintiff
violated any order of court.

There is no justification

under the rule for the dismissal.
POINT III:

DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUT NOTICE AND AN

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IS A DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF'S
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The United States Constitution, Amendment 14, provides
that no state "shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... "

The Utah

Constitution, Article I, §7, contains a similar provision:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."

Plaintiff's right under the

contract for architectural services to receive compensation
for his services is a property right and as such is entitled
to protection under these constitutional provisions.

McGrew

v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938}.
The action of the court in dismissing the action is a
clear violation of procedural due process to which plaintiff
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is entitled.

Due process involves notice of the proceeding,

an opportunity to be heard, and the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,

91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); Vernon v.
State, 245 Ala. 633, 18 So.2d 388 (1944).

The record is

clear that no notice was given to plaintiff, that there was
no opportunity to be heard, and that the court made an arbitrary decision with no grounds therefor.

Plaintiff has been

deprived of his "day in court" which is necessary to accord
due process.

Christ1ansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d

314 ( 1945) .
The trial court also violated Article I, §11 of the
Utah Constitution which requires:

"All courts shall be open,

and every person, for an injury done to him in his ...
property ..• shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay .... "
By its arbitrary action, the trial court has closed itself to
plaintiff and denied him his remedy by due course of law.
POINT IV:

ENTRY OF THE JUPGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS IN VIOLATION

OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE.
Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of Practice in the District
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah requires that
an order be prepared and submitted to the court within fifteen
days of a ruling.

In this matter the ruling was made on
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September 15, 1981 (Transcript, September 15, 1981) but
no formal order was submitted for more than two months.
The Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 20) was not signed by
the court until December 2, 1981, and was not filed in the
clerk's office until December 8, 1981.

During that entire

period of time, counsel had absolutely no notice that the
case had been dismissed or even had been on the court's calendar for any type of hearing.
Entry of the judgment also violated Rule 2.9(b) of the
Rules of Practice.

That rule requires a proposed order to

be submitted to opposing counsel before being presented to
the court.

Counsel for plaintiff did not receive a copy of

the order prior to its filing with the clerk, let alone
before it was presented to the judge.
itself (Record p. 20)

Neither the judgment

nor any other part of the record show

that the rule had been complied with.

It was error on the

part of the court to execute the order without a mailing
certificate showing that counsel for defendant had furnished
~t

a copy to counsel for plaintiff.

was also error for coun-

sel for defendant to submit the order to the court with no
notice to opposing counsel.

Plaintiff's counsel was thus
'

I

denied the right and opportunity to object to the obvious
errors contained in the order:
order to show cause.
appears in the record.
hearing.

(1) It was not made after an

None was served and no such order
(2)

It was not made after a regular

Plaintiff had been given no notice of the hearing.

-9-
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(3) It does not reflect that no one representing defendant
appeared at the hearing.
SUMMARY
Dismissal of the case by the District Court was an
abuse of the court's discretion and was done in violation
of rule and constitution.

The dismissal should be reversed

and the matter remanded to the trial court so that plaintiff
may have an opportunity to present his case at a trial.
Respectfully submitted,

t;J_~ C[). I~
Harold D. Mitchell
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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